1 00:00:02,935 --> 00:00:05,063 Controllers in Islamabad watch 2 00:00:05,188 --> 00:00:09,567 as Airblue Flight 202 heads straight towards a massive hill. 3 00:00:09,984 --> 00:00:11,944 He's not turning. 4 00:00:15,990 --> 00:00:17,867 They issue urgent warnings. 5 00:00:17,867 --> 00:00:19,243 Turn left immediately! 6 00:00:19,368 --> 00:00:21,662 ...but fail to prevent a disaster. 7 00:00:21,662 --> 00:00:24,123 - Terrain ahead. - We are going down! 8 00:00:24,123 --> 00:00:25,833 Pull up. 9 00:00:31,172 --> 00:00:35,343 It was the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history. 10 00:00:37,762 --> 00:00:40,348 When investigators listen to the CVR 11 00:00:40,348 --> 00:00:43,476 they hear the pilots realise they're in danger... 12 00:00:43,476 --> 00:00:45,228 - Terrain ahead. - Terrain, sir. 13 00:00:45,353 --> 00:00:47,271 Pull up. 14 00:00:47,271 --> 00:00:49,273 ...took steps to avoid it... 15 00:00:49,399 --> 00:00:50,650 Turning left. 16 00:00:50,650 --> 00:00:53,027 ...but were unable to save the lives 17 00:00:53,027 --> 00:00:55,071 of 152 people. 18 00:00:55,071 --> 00:00:57,240 Why aren't we turning left? 19 00:00:57,240 --> 00:01:00,284 The crew knew what they had to do. 20 00:01:00,284 --> 00:01:03,913 They reported that they were doing 21 00:01:04,038 --> 00:01:05,248 what they were supposed to do 22 00:01:05,373 --> 00:01:09,752 and yet the aircraft continued to fly in the wrong direction. 23 00:01:11,087 --> 00:01:13,089 Mayday, mayday! 24 00:01:15,675 --> 00:01:17,093 Pull up! 25 00:01:35,528 --> 00:01:37,739 Airblue Flight 202 26 00:01:37,739 --> 00:01:42,118 {\an8}begins its early morning descent towards Islamabad, Pakistan. 27 00:01:47,498 --> 00:01:49,834 {\an8}There are 146 passengers 28 00:01:49,834 --> 00:01:53,880 {\an8}and six crew on board the Airbus A-3-21. 29 00:01:58,801 --> 00:02:00,428 Airblue 202 30 00:02:00,428 --> 00:02:02,513 expect arrival to ILS runway 3-0, 31 00:02:02,513 --> 00:02:05,808 followed by circling approach to land runway 1-2. 32 00:02:05,808 --> 00:02:08,227 Understood, it will be ILS down to minima 33 00:02:08,227 --> 00:02:10,897 and then left downwind. 34 00:02:12,023 --> 00:02:13,566 Okay. 35 00:02:14,650 --> 00:02:16,819 Captain Pervez Chaudhry 36 00:02:16,819 --> 00:02:20,073 is one of the airline's most experienced pilots. 37 00:02:21,407 --> 00:02:24,660 Najam Qureshi is a former Airblue pilot 38 00:02:24,786 --> 00:02:26,954 who flew with Captain Chaudhry. 39 00:02:27,955 --> 00:02:30,833 {\an8}Captain Chaudhry had a lifetime of experience 40 00:02:30,833 --> 00:02:33,169 {\an8}flying with the Pakistan International Airline. 41 00:02:33,169 --> 00:02:34,462 He had a very successful career 42 00:02:34,462 --> 00:02:37,215 and he was pretty much approaching 43 00:02:37,340 --> 00:02:38,716 the end of his career. 44 00:02:38,716 --> 00:02:40,510 Airblue 202 cleared to 39-hundred 45 00:02:40,510 --> 00:02:42,345 for ILS approach to runway three-zero 46 00:02:42,470 --> 00:02:45,515 followed by circling approach to land on 1-2. 47 00:02:46,724 --> 00:02:49,185 First Officer Syed Ahmed 48 00:02:49,185 --> 00:02:50,561 has less commercial experience. 49 00:02:50,686 --> 00:02:53,481 He is a former F-16 fighter pilot 50 00:02:53,481 --> 00:02:56,692 and Squadron Leader in Pakistan's Air Force. 51 00:02:57,735 --> 00:03:01,572 Airblue 202, cleared to 3-9-hundred 52 00:03:01,698 --> 00:03:03,825 for ILS two-three-zero. 53 00:03:03,950 --> 00:03:07,662 Cleared to descend to 3-9-hundred. 54 00:03:11,916 --> 00:03:15,628 He had about 300 hours on the type so just brand new, 55 00:03:15,628 --> 00:03:18,297 learning the differences between the air force flying 56 00:03:18,297 --> 00:03:20,049 and the commercial flying. 57 00:03:21,134 --> 00:03:23,511 Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, 58 00:03:23,511 --> 00:03:27,014 is a city of more than 800,000 people. 59 00:03:27,849 --> 00:03:29,726 It's surrounded by the Himalayan foothills 60 00:03:29,851 --> 00:03:32,061 to the north and northeast. 61 00:03:35,815 --> 00:03:38,693 {\an8}The mountainous terrain means the only approach 62 00:03:38,693 --> 00:03:41,988 {\an8}to Islamabad's runway is from the south. 63 00:03:42,697 --> 00:03:44,407 {\an8}Due to the wind direction today, 64 00:03:44,532 --> 00:03:47,243 {\an8}planes are landing on Runway 1-2. 65 00:03:47,243 --> 00:03:49,412 {\an8}They must circle the airport 66 00:03:49,537 --> 00:03:52,749 {\an8}and make a visual approach to the other end of the runway. 67 00:03:55,710 --> 00:03:58,337 It is always safer to land with a head wind 68 00:03:58,337 --> 00:04:00,548 as compared to a tailwind. 69 00:04:00,882 --> 00:04:03,468 When the winds change beyond a certain limit 70 00:04:03,593 --> 00:04:06,512 the air traffic controller will switch the runways. 71 00:04:06,512 --> 00:04:10,099 That will ensure the plane lands in a head wind. 72 00:04:12,977 --> 00:04:15,605 Thick clouds envelop the airport, 73 00:04:15,605 --> 00:04:17,732 making landings difficult. 74 00:04:17,732 --> 00:04:19,650 China Southern is going around 75 00:04:19,776 --> 00:04:21,736 and diverting back to Urumqi. 76 00:04:21,736 --> 00:04:25,281 China Southern confirming, diverting back to Urumqi. 77 00:04:25,281 --> 00:04:27,658 Attention all landing aircraft, 78 00:04:27,658 --> 00:04:31,621 China Southern is diverting due to weather. 79 00:04:32,872 --> 00:04:37,001 If at any point you lose sight of the airfield, 80 00:04:37,126 --> 00:04:39,712 {\an8}you should abandon the approach completely 81 00:04:39,712 --> 00:04:42,715 {\an8}and carry out the missed approach procedure. 82 00:04:45,426 --> 00:04:46,761 Flight 202 83 00:04:46,761 --> 00:04:49,806 is now less than 10 minutes from landing. 84 00:04:55,269 --> 00:04:56,979 Gear down. 85 00:05:01,401 --> 00:05:03,778 Gear down. 86 00:05:05,279 --> 00:05:07,865 The plane reaches the minimum altitude 87 00:05:07,990 --> 00:05:11,744 to which the pilots can descend without the runway in sight. 88 00:05:13,788 --> 00:05:16,457 As soon as you see the runway you turn right 89 00:05:16,457 --> 00:05:17,750 and then after that 90 00:05:17,750 --> 00:05:19,836 you're supposed to keep the runway in sight. 91 00:05:20,712 --> 00:05:24,257 Commencing right turn, heading 3-5-2. 92 00:05:26,008 --> 00:05:27,343 Call it in. 93 00:05:29,178 --> 00:05:31,305 Airblue 202 94 00:05:31,305 --> 00:05:32,849 maintaining 2-500 95 00:05:32,974 --> 00:05:35,893 and turning right heading 3-5-2. 96 00:05:36,018 --> 00:05:38,062 Airblue 202 confirming 97 00:05:38,187 --> 00:05:42,025 at 2,500, turning right heading 3-5-2. 98 00:05:47,155 --> 00:05:50,700 Captain Choudhry initiates the first turn 99 00:05:50,700 --> 00:05:52,702 of the circling approach. 100 00:05:52,827 --> 00:05:54,245 Airblue 202 101 00:05:54,370 --> 00:05:57,582 continue on the circle for landing on runway 1-2. 102 00:05:57,582 --> 00:05:59,917 Caution, low clouds and visibility. 103 00:06:00,043 --> 00:06:01,878 Maintain visual with the airport. 104 00:06:04,338 --> 00:06:05,882 Even in the poor weather, 105 00:06:06,007 --> 00:06:07,925 it's up to the pilots to decide 106 00:06:08,051 --> 00:06:10,261 whether they should continue the approach or not 107 00:06:10,261 --> 00:06:13,222 depending whether they have the runway in sight. 108 00:06:16,976 --> 00:06:19,187 The controller expects to see the lights 109 00:06:19,187 --> 00:06:22,648 of the Airbus as it flies past the airfield. 110 00:06:29,739 --> 00:06:32,909 Radar, I can't see Airblue 202, 111 00:06:33,034 --> 00:06:34,911 what's his current location, please? 112 00:06:34,911 --> 00:06:37,747 He's approaching the No Fly Zone north of the airfield. 113 00:06:37,872 --> 00:06:40,083 Instruct him to turn left immediately. 114 00:06:41,584 --> 00:06:46,255 Flight 202 is much further north than expected 115 00:06:46,255 --> 00:06:50,093 and needs to turn left for the approach to runway 1-2. 116 00:06:51,052 --> 00:06:55,223 Airblue 202, turn left heading 1-8-0. 117 00:06:57,016 --> 00:06:59,310 Confirm he has visual with the ground. 118 00:06:59,435 --> 00:07:02,105 If not instruct him to climb and execute a missed approach. 119 00:07:02,230 --> 00:07:06,776 Airblue 202, confirm you have airfield in sight. 120 00:07:08,903 --> 00:07:11,155 The controllers had radar. 121 00:07:11,155 --> 00:07:14,117 They could see what the aircraft was doing. 122 00:07:14,242 --> 00:07:16,244 They could see that the aircraft was not doing 123 00:07:16,244 --> 00:07:20,123 what the procedure said they should be doing. 124 00:07:20,123 --> 00:07:21,499 Ask again. 125 00:07:21,624 --> 00:07:26,212 Airblue 202 please confirm you have visual with the ground. 126 00:07:34,303 --> 00:07:37,306 Airblue 202, visual with the ground. 127 00:07:38,641 --> 00:07:41,144 He's confirming visual. 128 00:07:42,687 --> 00:07:44,981 He's not turning. 129 00:07:45,982 --> 00:07:48,443 Controllers can see that Flight 202 130 00:07:48,443 --> 00:07:52,238 is rapidly approaching the hills north of the airport. 131 00:07:57,076 --> 00:07:59,871 In the cockpit the pilots are struggling 132 00:07:59,996 --> 00:08:03,249 to turn their plane away from the mountains ahead. 133 00:08:05,043 --> 00:08:07,170 Why aren't we turning left? 134 00:08:17,096 --> 00:08:18,806 Why isn't it turning left? 135 00:08:18,806 --> 00:08:21,642 Terrain Ahead. 136 00:08:21,642 --> 00:08:24,312 Pull up. Terrain. 137 00:08:24,312 --> 00:08:26,189 Terrain, sir. 138 00:08:26,314 --> 00:08:27,690 Pull up. 139 00:08:27,690 --> 00:08:30,151 Instruct him to turn left immediately. 140 00:08:31,903 --> 00:08:35,364 The controllers can't believe what they're seeing. 141 00:08:35,490 --> 00:08:37,658 Here's a guy with 25,000 hours 142 00:08:37,658 --> 00:08:40,369 and he's flying directly towards a mountain. 143 00:08:42,622 --> 00:08:45,541 In the cabin passengers have become aware 144 00:08:45,541 --> 00:08:47,502 that something's not right. 145 00:08:52,298 --> 00:08:55,551 They're approaching the 5,000 foot Margalla Hills. 146 00:08:57,845 --> 00:09:00,056 Terrain ahead. Pull up. 147 00:09:00,056 --> 00:09:03,434 Sir, we are going down. Sir, we are going down! 148 00:09:03,434 --> 00:09:05,895 Message from radar, turn left immediately. 149 00:09:06,020 --> 00:09:07,689 Terrain ahead. Pull up... 150 00:09:07,689 --> 00:09:09,190 We are going down! 151 00:09:09,190 --> 00:09:11,025 Pull up. 152 00:09:22,578 --> 00:09:26,916 Flight 202 has crashed into the Margalla Hills, 153 00:09:26,916 --> 00:09:29,585 seven miles from the airport. 154 00:09:31,379 --> 00:09:35,133 The wreckage lies at an altitude of nearly 3,000 feet. 155 00:09:35,133 --> 00:09:38,928 It will be difficult for rescuers to reach the site. 156 00:09:43,141 --> 00:09:44,976 We couldn't get access to it 157 00:09:45,101 --> 00:09:46,978 with a car or a truck. 158 00:09:46,978 --> 00:09:50,898 Even with helicopters, there was no place to set down. 159 00:09:52,150 --> 00:09:54,944 {\an8}So the only way to get to the accident site 160 00:09:54,944 --> 00:09:56,904 {\an8}was with a long, slow climb. 161 00:09:59,407 --> 00:10:02,160 It takes more than half-an-hour for rescuers 162 00:10:02,285 --> 00:10:05,204 and volunteers to make their way up the steep hill 163 00:10:05,204 --> 00:10:09,083 to the crash site in hopes of finding survivors. 164 00:10:18,134 --> 00:10:20,261 When crews do reach the site, 165 00:10:20,386 --> 00:10:23,931 they find a scene of complete devastation. 166 00:10:34,317 --> 00:10:37,028 152 people died in this accident. 167 00:10:37,820 --> 00:10:42,575 It was the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history. 168 00:10:46,954 --> 00:10:51,042 Why did a modern airplane fly into well-known mountains 169 00:10:51,167 --> 00:10:54,253 north of the airport in Islamabad? 170 00:11:01,803 --> 00:11:04,514 Investigators arrive at the accident site 171 00:11:04,639 --> 00:11:08,434 to study the wreckage of Airblue Flight 202. 172 00:11:10,686 --> 00:11:12,939 When an aircraft flies into mountains, 173 00:11:13,064 --> 00:11:15,817 there are really two areas that we're looking at 174 00:11:15,817 --> 00:11:18,653 in terms of the root cause. 175 00:11:19,112 --> 00:11:23,616 {\an8}One is a sudden and unexpected loss of control. 176 00:11:23,741 --> 00:11:26,828 {\an8}The other would be the aircraft 177 00:11:26,828 --> 00:11:29,330 has actually stayed in control of the pilots, 178 00:11:29,330 --> 00:11:32,291 and still somehow been flown into a mountain. 179 00:11:36,462 --> 00:11:38,339 An analysis of the engines 180 00:11:38,339 --> 00:11:41,217 shows that they were fully functional at the time of impact 181 00:11:41,342 --> 00:11:44,470 and capable of producing maximum thrust. 182 00:11:48,182 --> 00:11:51,185 Okay, good work everyone. Start heading back down. 183 00:11:51,185 --> 00:11:56,566 Right. So the stabilizer was set at 3.5 degrees nose up. 184 00:11:56,566 --> 00:12:00,570 Landing gear was down. Engines at climb power. 185 00:12:00,570 --> 00:12:06,117 So configured for landing but climbing at full power. 186 00:12:08,786 --> 00:12:10,955 {\an8}An examination of the electrical 187 00:12:10,955 --> 00:12:13,082 {\an8}and mechanical components that we could find, 188 00:12:13,207 --> 00:12:16,711 {\an8}there was no obvious damage or mechanical failure. 189 00:12:18,171 --> 00:12:20,965 They were trying to land here. 190 00:12:21,591 --> 00:12:24,135 But then they slam into the Margalla Hills, 191 00:12:24,260 --> 00:12:27,305 seven miles north of the runway. 192 00:12:29,098 --> 00:12:32,143 How did they get so far off course? 193 00:12:34,395 --> 00:12:37,482 For an approach that was supposed to be 194 00:12:37,607 --> 00:12:41,611 {\an8}a very tight approach because of the existence of the hills, 195 00:12:41,736 --> 00:12:44,530 {\an8}that is extraordinary. 196 00:12:45,823 --> 00:12:48,493 They were approaching from the southeast for a landing here, 197 00:12:48,618 --> 00:12:50,495 on runway 1-2. 198 00:12:58,252 --> 00:13:01,547 Scattered clouds, rain. 199 00:13:02,131 --> 00:13:04,676 Visibility was at 3.5 kilometers. 200 00:13:05,343 --> 00:13:07,678 Challenging conditions. 201 00:13:10,431 --> 00:13:12,183 Could the cloudy conditions 202 00:13:12,183 --> 00:13:14,352 have been a factor in the accident? 203 00:13:15,436 --> 00:13:19,190 When an aircraft flies into high ground, 204 00:13:19,315 --> 00:13:22,610 {\an8}one thing that is almost certainly a factor 205 00:13:22,610 --> 00:13:25,071 {\an8}is poor visibility, 206 00:13:25,071 --> 00:13:28,533 uh, low cloud, fog, call it what you will. 207 00:13:29,951 --> 00:13:31,953 Visibility would have been an issue. 208 00:13:31,953 --> 00:13:34,288 But you don't need to see the Margalla Hills 209 00:13:34,288 --> 00:13:36,457 to know that they're there. 210 00:13:40,670 --> 00:13:43,965 {\an8}Everyone knows towards the northeast of the runway 211 00:13:43,965 --> 00:13:45,383 {\an8}there are mountains. 212 00:13:45,383 --> 00:13:47,510 {\an8}They are clearly marked on the maps. 213 00:13:47,635 --> 00:13:50,638 - Terrain Ahead. - Sir, we're going down! 214 00:13:50,638 --> 00:13:55,143 Pull up. Pull up. 215 00:13:58,646 --> 00:14:01,357 Can the controller explain why the crew 216 00:14:01,482 --> 00:14:05,153 of Flight 202 couldn't avoid the mountains? 217 00:14:06,320 --> 00:14:09,157 Radar control informed him he'd be doing the circling 218 00:14:09,157 --> 00:14:11,033 approach to runway 1-2. 219 00:14:11,159 --> 00:14:13,411 Airblue 202 expect arrival at ILS 3-0, 220 00:14:13,536 --> 00:14:16,831 followed by circling approach to land runway 1-2. 221 00:14:18,166 --> 00:14:20,710 And he understood the approach. 222 00:14:20,710 --> 00:14:23,338 Yes, sir. He did. 223 00:14:23,338 --> 00:14:27,300 Understood. It'll be ILS down to minima... 224 00:14:27,300 --> 00:14:30,178 ...and then left downwind. 225 00:14:31,012 --> 00:14:32,847 And then? 226 00:14:32,847 --> 00:14:35,516 That's when I assumed control, 227 00:14:35,516 --> 00:14:39,604 as he began the right turn to the circling approach. 228 00:14:42,523 --> 00:14:44,692 The circling approach 229 00:14:44,692 --> 00:14:47,487 involves four carefully timed turns. 230 00:14:47,612 --> 00:14:51,449 The first to the right followed by a left turn 231 00:14:51,449 --> 00:14:53,951 that takes the plane parallel to the runway. 232 00:14:53,951 --> 00:14:58,039 The two final turns line the plane up for the landing 233 00:14:58,164 --> 00:15:00,249 on runway 1-2. 234 00:15:00,375 --> 00:15:03,044 Pilots must keep the runway in sight 235 00:15:03,044 --> 00:15:05,630 for the duration of this approach. 236 00:15:08,716 --> 00:15:10,968 After about a minute 237 00:15:10,968 --> 00:15:12,887 I expected to see him fly by, 238 00:15:15,348 --> 00:15:17,141 but he never did. 239 00:15:17,141 --> 00:15:20,353 I asked the crew if they had the runway in sight, 240 00:15:20,353 --> 00:15:22,480 and they confirmed that they did. 241 00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:27,193 Airblue 202 please confirm you have visual with the ground. 242 00:15:29,320 --> 00:15:32,156 Airblue 202, visual with the ground. 243 00:15:33,491 --> 00:15:35,284 But he kept flying further and further 244 00:15:35,284 --> 00:15:37,078 away from the airport, 245 00:15:37,078 --> 00:15:39,539 directly towards the hills. 246 00:15:41,499 --> 00:15:44,085 After breaking off from the approach, 247 00:15:44,210 --> 00:15:47,130 they are supposed to turn after 30 seconds. 248 00:15:47,255 --> 00:15:50,258 Instead they kept going for almost two minutes. 249 00:15:51,175 --> 00:15:54,679 We tried to stop him several times. 250 00:15:56,055 --> 00:15:58,391 But it was too late. 251 00:15:58,391 --> 00:16:01,602 Message from radar, turn left immediately! 252 00:16:10,194 --> 00:16:12,447 We couldn't prevent... 253 00:16:14,198 --> 00:16:16,951 what happened. 254 00:16:22,373 --> 00:16:24,959 It's all here, on the radar track. 255 00:16:29,714 --> 00:16:33,301 The crew knew what they had to do. 256 00:16:33,301 --> 00:16:36,137 They reported that they were doing 257 00:16:36,137 --> 00:16:38,514 what they were supposed to do, 258 00:16:38,639 --> 00:16:43,061 and yet the aircraft continued to fly in the wrong direction. 259 00:16:43,061 --> 00:16:45,480 Terrain ahead. 260 00:16:47,565 --> 00:16:48,691 Pull up. 261 00:16:48,816 --> 00:16:51,069 How could the pilots have ended up 262 00:16:51,069 --> 00:16:53,571 so dangerously off course? 263 00:16:59,952 --> 00:17:02,163 Investigators look into the background 264 00:17:02,163 --> 00:17:04,624 of Flight 202's pilots 265 00:17:04,624 --> 00:17:08,461 to determine if the approach into Islamabad was mishandled. 266 00:17:09,921 --> 00:17:14,342 The Captain had years of experience with major airlines. 267 00:17:15,927 --> 00:17:19,514 Captain Chaudhry has been flying 268 00:17:19,514 --> 00:17:21,557 for more than 40 years. 269 00:17:21,683 --> 00:17:25,770 He has accumulated more than 25,000 flying hours 270 00:17:25,895 --> 00:17:27,772 throughout his career 271 00:17:27,772 --> 00:17:30,775 but only about 1,000 of those were on the Airbus. 272 00:17:35,113 --> 00:17:38,533 The first officer, however, is a whole different story 273 00:17:40,451 --> 00:17:42,537 First Officer Syed Ahmed 274 00:17:42,662 --> 00:17:44,747 had far fewer hours than the Captain. 275 00:17:44,747 --> 00:17:49,252 The former fighter pilot had recently joined the airline 276 00:17:49,377 --> 00:17:52,588 and had accumulated only 286 hours 277 00:17:52,588 --> 00:17:55,633 on Airbus A-3-20 airplanes. 278 00:17:58,052 --> 00:18:00,304 Two very different pilots. 279 00:18:00,304 --> 00:18:03,433 One nearing the end of his career 280 00:18:03,558 --> 00:18:05,393 with thousands of hours of experience, 281 00:18:05,393 --> 00:18:09,814 and the other just starting off his commercial career. 282 00:18:10,565 --> 00:18:12,442 But neither of them had a ton of experience 283 00:18:12,567 --> 00:18:14,694 with the Airbus A-3-21. 284 00:18:17,655 --> 00:18:19,824 Did the pilots' lack of experience 285 00:18:19,824 --> 00:18:23,661 on this type of plane play a role in the accident? 286 00:18:26,164 --> 00:18:30,960 Experience is generally considered to be an asset. 287 00:18:30,960 --> 00:18:34,172 {\an8}The only potential downside is that of course, 288 00:18:34,172 --> 00:18:36,049 {\an8}if you've got a lot of experience 289 00:18:36,174 --> 00:18:37,592 of one particular thing, 290 00:18:37,717 --> 00:18:40,762 it actually might be more difficult to learn 291 00:18:40,762 --> 00:18:43,848 how to operate this new type of aircraft. 292 00:18:49,729 --> 00:18:53,858 Okay, so they're supposed to perform their approach 293 00:18:53,983 --> 00:18:55,234 within this area. 294 00:18:55,359 --> 00:18:57,528 Anything beyond this is outside 295 00:18:57,528 --> 00:19:00,698 the airport's 4.3 mile protection zone. 296 00:19:02,158 --> 00:19:04,494 Okay, let's see his track. 297 00:19:05,286 --> 00:19:09,499 Investigators examine Flight 202's radar track 298 00:19:09,624 --> 00:19:13,002 to see how the pilots set up their approach. 299 00:19:13,002 --> 00:19:14,545 Alright. 300 00:19:14,545 --> 00:19:18,716 So they make their first turn here, 301 00:19:18,841 --> 00:19:25,390 and then head straight out of the protection zone. 302 00:19:25,390 --> 00:19:29,102 And this left turn takes them directly 303 00:19:29,227 --> 00:19:30,978 into the Margalla Hills. 304 00:19:33,398 --> 00:19:36,067 The radar track shows the that the pilots 305 00:19:36,192 --> 00:19:37,819 flew closer and closer 306 00:19:37,819 --> 00:19:40,738 to the mountains surrounding Islamabad. 307 00:19:40,738 --> 00:19:42,698 Wouldn't they have gotten a warning 308 00:19:42,698 --> 00:19:44,909 that they were approaching the hills? 309 00:19:50,456 --> 00:19:51,874 Yes, sir. 310 00:19:51,874 --> 00:19:55,920 It should have sounded 60 seconds before impact. 311 00:19:58,423 --> 00:20:01,551 The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 312 00:20:01,676 --> 00:20:07,348 {\an8}looks downward to see the height that you're at above ground, 313 00:20:07,348 --> 00:20:09,350 but it also looks ahead 314 00:20:09,350 --> 00:20:13,688 to see any terrain that you're flying towards. 315 00:20:16,357 --> 00:20:18,735 If they got a warning, 316 00:20:18,860 --> 00:20:24,699 why didn't they try to pull up or turn to avoid it? 317 00:20:27,368 --> 00:20:30,705 Did the pilots of Flight 202 get any warning 318 00:20:30,705 --> 00:20:32,874 of an impending collision? 319 00:20:32,999 --> 00:20:36,085 The crew would have been given pictures 320 00:20:36,085 --> 00:20:39,797 on their navigation display of the approaching terrain, 321 00:20:39,797 --> 00:20:43,092 and they would have been given aural warnings. 322 00:20:43,968 --> 00:20:47,764 So, since they flew directly into the terrain, 323 00:20:47,764 --> 00:20:50,975 has the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 324 00:20:50,975 --> 00:20:53,144 completely failed? 325 00:21:03,529 --> 00:21:05,281 Don't leave me in suspense. 326 00:21:05,406 --> 00:21:08,076 Did they get any Ground Proximity warnings? 327 00:21:08,993 --> 00:21:10,995 They sure did. 328 00:21:16,667 --> 00:21:19,003 The cockpit data shows 329 00:21:19,128 --> 00:21:21,339 that in the final minute of the flight, 330 00:21:21,339 --> 00:21:24,133 the crew got 21 separate warnings 331 00:21:24,133 --> 00:21:26,594 about the rising terrain ahead. 332 00:21:30,723 --> 00:21:34,060 Okay, so that answers that. 333 00:21:35,978 --> 00:21:40,400 {\an8}Over 21 times, we saw 'Terrain, terrain, pull up. 334 00:21:40,525 --> 00:21:42,276 {\an8}Terrain ahead, pull up.' 335 00:21:42,276 --> 00:21:44,946 {\an8}There's no way that the captain missed that warning. 336 00:21:45,071 --> 00:21:48,074 The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 337 00:21:48,199 --> 00:21:50,201 was working properly. 338 00:21:50,326 --> 00:21:51,786 Terrain Ahead. 339 00:21:51,911 --> 00:21:53,830 If the warning system was operating, 340 00:21:53,830 --> 00:21:55,998 why would the pilots ignore it 341 00:21:55,998 --> 00:21:59,085 and allow the accident to happen? 342 00:22:00,128 --> 00:22:03,089 If you hear a full 'terrain pull up' warning 343 00:22:03,214 --> 00:22:06,759 from the EGPWS, the reaction should be immediate. 344 00:22:06,759 --> 00:22:09,470 It should be to apply full power, 345 00:22:09,470 --> 00:22:11,347 pull the nose of the aircraft up, 346 00:22:11,347 --> 00:22:12,890 get it moving away from the ground. 347 00:22:12,890 --> 00:22:15,810 And that should be done before any questions are asked. 348 00:22:21,399 --> 00:22:24,986 Why didn't the crew of Airblue Flight 202 349 00:22:24,986 --> 00:22:26,696 act on terrain warnings 350 00:22:26,696 --> 00:22:29,574 and steer their plane away from the mountains? 351 00:22:29,574 --> 00:22:32,243 Islamabad, Airblue 202... 352 00:22:32,368 --> 00:22:34,412 Investigators listen to the cockpit 353 00:22:34,537 --> 00:22:35,621 voice recording. 354 00:22:35,621 --> 00:22:37,790 ...what are current conditions, please. 355 00:22:37,915 --> 00:22:39,709 Airblue 202, 356 00:22:39,834 --> 00:22:42,712 visibility is now 3.5 kilometers with rain. 357 00:22:42,837 --> 00:22:45,548 Wind 1-6 knots zero five zero degrees... 358 00:22:45,548 --> 00:22:48,843 ...Runway 1-2 currently in use. 359 00:22:48,843 --> 00:22:52,847 They focus on how the crew set up for landing. 360 00:22:53,639 --> 00:22:57,602 - It'll be runway 1-2. - Yes, and visibility is crap. 361 00:23:00,355 --> 00:23:02,106 The weather was marginal, 362 00:23:02,231 --> 00:23:05,860 {\an8}and marginal weather makes you nervous because you don't know 363 00:23:05,860 --> 00:23:08,529 whether you're going to be able to see anything at all. 364 00:23:09,030 --> 00:23:12,950 And the captain clearly was nervous about this approach. 365 00:23:15,620 --> 00:23:16,913 Did the Captain proceed 366 00:23:16,913 --> 00:23:19,207 with an approach he wasn't comfortable with? 367 00:23:20,458 --> 00:23:23,169 Set waypoints for runway 1-2... 368 00:23:23,294 --> 00:23:27,632 ...Radial 0-2-6, 5 miles abeam. 369 00:23:34,430 --> 00:23:36,307 Wait. Stop. 370 00:23:36,307 --> 00:23:40,895 Why is he asking him to input a course to the runway? 371 00:23:42,188 --> 00:23:45,233 This is supposed to be a visual approach. 372 00:23:47,235 --> 00:23:49,320 It didn't make any sense for the captain 373 00:23:49,445 --> 00:23:52,448 to be entering waypoints into the flight management system. 374 00:23:53,408 --> 00:23:56,994 {\an8}The circling approach is by definition a visual approach. 375 00:23:56,994 --> 00:23:58,454 {\an8}So, there is no way 376 00:23:58,579 --> 00:24:00,998 that any pilot would normally do this. 377 00:24:03,126 --> 00:24:06,629 Then, just two miles from the airport, 378 00:24:06,629 --> 00:24:09,507 the pilots of Airblue flight 202 379 00:24:09,632 --> 00:24:11,926 hear of a flight landing ahead of them. 380 00:24:11,926 --> 00:24:14,220 Be advised that a PIA 7-3-7 381 00:24:14,345 --> 00:24:17,181 has landed on runway 1-2 safely. 382 00:24:19,726 --> 00:24:22,687 Commencing right turn heading 3-5-2. 383 00:24:25,606 --> 00:24:27,859 That could have caused the pilot to say, 384 00:24:27,859 --> 00:24:30,445 'Hey, if they can get in, we can get in too.' 385 00:24:30,445 --> 00:24:33,072 Wait, stop, stop. 386 00:24:34,198 --> 00:24:36,534 So he starts his turn later than usual, 387 00:24:36,534 --> 00:24:39,620 half a mile from the runway. 388 00:24:44,375 --> 00:24:47,837 Instead of breaking off early, they had to continue on 389 00:24:47,837 --> 00:24:50,048 because of the low visibility and low ceilings. 390 00:24:50,048 --> 00:24:51,966 And they did not break off to the right 391 00:24:51,966 --> 00:24:53,885 until the last possible point, 392 00:24:53,885 --> 00:24:56,179 which was at the end of the runway. 393 00:24:56,179 --> 00:24:58,556 Concerned with poor visibility, 394 00:24:58,556 --> 00:25:01,768 Captain Chaudhry makes a baffling decision. 395 00:25:01,893 --> 00:25:04,437 Switching to NAV Mode 396 00:25:04,562 --> 00:25:07,857 for managed approach to Runway 1-2. 397 00:25:07,982 --> 00:25:11,110 There he goes switching to NAV Mode. He can't be visual. 398 00:25:12,904 --> 00:25:15,490 Carrying out the circling approach 399 00:25:15,490 --> 00:25:17,367 using the auto-pilot to navigate 400 00:25:17,492 --> 00:25:19,952 is a violation of procedures. 401 00:25:21,746 --> 00:25:24,499 As soon as you select the NAV mode 402 00:25:24,499 --> 00:25:28,961 {\an8}the plane starts to fly the pre-programmed waypoints. 403 00:25:29,712 --> 00:25:32,256 And at this point Captain Chaudhry's no more 404 00:25:32,256 --> 00:25:33,424 flying the visual approach. 405 00:25:33,549 --> 00:25:36,010 Okay, sir... 406 00:25:38,304 --> 00:25:41,182 But, are you visual? 407 00:25:42,183 --> 00:25:44,185 I have a visual. 408 00:25:45,978 --> 00:25:48,856 Chaudhry insists he can see the runway 409 00:25:48,856 --> 00:25:52,860 but investigators are certain he could not. 410 00:25:53,820 --> 00:25:55,780 They can't see the airfield any longer 411 00:25:55,780 --> 00:25:57,615 because they've just got to the far side of it. 412 00:25:57,615 --> 00:25:59,867 There is no airfield in sight. 413 00:26:01,661 --> 00:26:07,041 So instead of turning left to fly parallel with the runway, 414 00:26:07,166 --> 00:26:10,545 he keeps flying in this direction 415 00:26:10,670 --> 00:26:13,047 moving further and further from the airport. 416 00:26:14,841 --> 00:26:17,051 Sir, we're reaching higher ground. 417 00:26:18,678 --> 00:26:19,721 Terrain ahead. 418 00:26:19,846 --> 00:26:21,973 Terrain ahead. 419 00:26:21,973 --> 00:26:24,350 Sir, there's terrain ahead. 420 00:26:24,350 --> 00:26:26,686 Sir, turn left. 421 00:26:26,686 --> 00:26:28,730 Terrain ahead. 422 00:26:30,440 --> 00:26:32,358 It should be turning. 423 00:26:32,358 --> 00:26:33,818 Terrain ahead. 424 00:26:33,943 --> 00:26:35,737 As the Captain struggles to turn away 425 00:26:35,862 --> 00:26:37,447 from the hills, 426 00:26:37,572 --> 00:26:39,949 controllers become concerned. 427 00:26:40,074 --> 00:26:44,328 Airblue 202 confirm you have airfield in site. 428 00:26:44,829 --> 00:26:46,873 Uh, wha... what should I tell him, sir? 429 00:26:46,873 --> 00:26:48,791 Terrain ahead. 430 00:26:48,791 --> 00:26:50,376 Tell him... tell him. 431 00:26:50,501 --> 00:26:51,627 Pull up. 432 00:26:51,627 --> 00:26:53,796 The crew doesn't reply straight away. 433 00:26:53,921 --> 00:26:57,133 {\an8}Probably because the first officer knows full well 434 00:26:57,133 --> 00:26:59,177 {\an8}that, no, they don't have visual contact with the airfield. 435 00:26:59,302 --> 00:27:02,680 But he waits for his captain to tell him what to say. 436 00:27:02,680 --> 00:27:04,307 Airblue 202 437 00:27:04,307 --> 00:27:06,309 please confirm you have visual with the ground. 438 00:27:06,434 --> 00:27:08,811 Terrain ahead. Pull up. 439 00:27:08,936 --> 00:27:11,856 Airblue 202, visual with the ground. 440 00:27:14,108 --> 00:27:17,779 In the end, the crew tells air traffic control 441 00:27:17,779 --> 00:27:20,865 that they are in visual contact with the ground. 442 00:27:20,990 --> 00:27:22,408 Now, that's not untrue. 443 00:27:22,408 --> 00:27:25,578 But it's not the same thing as being visual with the airfield. 444 00:27:25,578 --> 00:27:27,288 It feels more like a reply 445 00:27:27,288 --> 00:27:30,166 designed to get air traffic control off their backs. 446 00:27:30,291 --> 00:27:33,044 Sir, we are approaching terrain ahead. 447 00:27:33,044 --> 00:27:34,962 Yes, I know. We are turning left. 448 00:27:34,962 --> 00:27:37,173 - Pull up. - Pull... pull up, sir. 449 00:27:37,298 --> 00:27:39,634 - Stop, stop. - Sir, pull up! 450 00:27:39,759 --> 00:27:41,761 The Captain says he's turning left. 451 00:27:41,886 --> 00:27:46,808 But he keeps flying directly towards the hills. 452 00:27:49,352 --> 00:27:51,854 Investigators are unable to explain 453 00:27:51,979 --> 00:27:55,108 why Captain Chaudhry could not alter his course 454 00:27:55,233 --> 00:27:57,902 and steer away from the mountains. 455 00:28:00,822 --> 00:28:04,325 - Terrain Ahead. - Sir. Turn left! 456 00:28:04,325 --> 00:28:07,245 The final minute of the CVR 457 00:28:07,245 --> 00:28:10,373 reveals a picture of chaos and confusion. 458 00:28:10,498 --> 00:28:14,085 Pull... pull up, sir. Sir, pull up! 459 00:28:16,838 --> 00:28:19,590 They're applying power, trying to climb. 460 00:28:20,967 --> 00:28:22,719 Terrain Ahead. 461 00:28:22,719 --> 00:28:25,304 Sir, pull up, sir! 462 00:28:25,304 --> 00:28:28,766 Investigators hear First Officer Ahmed 463 00:28:28,891 --> 00:28:30,601 pleading with his Captain to pull up. 464 00:28:30,601 --> 00:28:33,438 Why aren't we turning left? 465 00:28:34,439 --> 00:28:36,107 Pull up. 466 00:28:37,525 --> 00:28:40,194 Terrain Ahead. Pull up. 467 00:28:40,319 --> 00:28:41,988 Terrain, sir! 468 00:28:41,988 --> 00:28:44,365 Terrain ahead. 469 00:28:44,949 --> 00:28:47,160 Sir, we are going down! 470 00:28:47,285 --> 00:28:48,327 Pull up. 471 00:28:48,453 --> 00:28:50,830 Message from radar, turn left immediately! 472 00:28:50,955 --> 00:28:52,415 Pull up. 473 00:28:52,540 --> 00:28:55,543 - Sir, we are going down! - Pull up. 474 00:29:03,468 --> 00:29:08,473 All they had to do was turn away from those hills. 475 00:29:11,309 --> 00:29:13,644 Despite reacting to the terrain warnings, 476 00:29:13,644 --> 00:29:18,149 the pilots could not steer their plane away from the mountains. 477 00:29:20,485 --> 00:29:23,071 I think they knew what was happening. 478 00:29:23,071 --> 00:29:25,323 I think they knew that they had to turn left. 479 00:29:25,323 --> 00:29:28,659 For some reason, the aircraft didn't turn left. 480 00:29:30,369 --> 00:29:33,539 Will flight 202's Flight Data Recorder 481 00:29:33,539 --> 00:29:37,126 explain why Captain Chaudhry didn't, or couldn't, 482 00:29:37,251 --> 00:29:39,712 turn and avoid the mountains? 483 00:29:39,712 --> 00:29:42,298 Can we see the altitude please? 484 00:29:43,758 --> 00:29:46,928 The minimum altitude is 2,500 feet. 485 00:29:48,054 --> 00:29:50,973 Investigators can see that Chaudhry 486 00:29:51,099 --> 00:29:54,352 dialed in an altitude below what's permitted. 487 00:29:55,269 --> 00:29:57,647 There's only one reason it would drop below that. 488 00:30:00,108 --> 00:30:06,197 Commencing right turn. Heading 3-5-2. 489 00:30:09,450 --> 00:30:12,120 There's no earthly reason for doing it 490 00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:14,705 because the minimums are there for a very good reason. 491 00:30:15,748 --> 00:30:18,459 {\an8}The only reason why they ever break the minimums 492 00:30:18,459 --> 00:30:20,878 {\an8}is because they can't see the ground properly, 493 00:30:20,878 --> 00:30:22,964 and they want to get closer to it. 494 00:30:23,631 --> 00:30:25,967 Can we see the flight path? 495 00:30:27,093 --> 00:30:30,471 You see. He's way off course, 496 00:30:30,596 --> 00:30:34,559 in heavy fog, and has clearly lost visual. 497 00:30:34,934 --> 00:30:37,645 Let's see the auto-pilot modes. 498 00:30:39,355 --> 00:30:44,360 So, he asks the automation to take over. 499 00:30:47,655 --> 00:30:50,408 More than four miles off course, 500 00:30:50,408 --> 00:30:52,910 Captain Chaudhry makes his biggest error 501 00:30:53,035 --> 00:30:56,539 by switching modes on his autopilot. 502 00:30:58,249 --> 00:31:01,836 The captain switched from heading mode to NAV mode. 503 00:31:02,587 --> 00:31:06,424 {\an8}And the aircraft turned left to heading of three zero zero... 504 00:31:09,594 --> 00:31:12,221 Towards the mountain. 505 00:31:13,181 --> 00:31:15,892 The Airbus now makes a left turn 506 00:31:15,892 --> 00:31:18,394 towards a pre-determined waypoint, 507 00:31:18,394 --> 00:31:22,065 bringing the flight dangerously close to the mountains. 508 00:31:23,274 --> 00:31:26,360 He's approaching the No Fly Zone north of the airfield. 509 00:31:28,154 --> 00:31:30,531 From this point on, air traffic control 510 00:31:30,531 --> 00:31:32,617 continued to urge the flight to turn left 511 00:31:32,617 --> 00:31:34,994 because they knew they were in the vicinity 512 00:31:34,994 --> 00:31:37,205 of the high mountainous terrain. 513 00:31:37,205 --> 00:31:40,500 Terrain ahead. Pull up. 514 00:31:40,500 --> 00:31:43,252 Airblue 202 turn left heading 1-8-0. 515 00:31:43,252 --> 00:31:45,838 Why aren't we turning left? 516 00:31:45,963 --> 00:31:47,465 Pull up. 517 00:31:47,924 --> 00:31:50,802 Can we see what he's selecting? 518 00:31:53,346 --> 00:31:56,057 He's dialing in a left turn. 519 00:32:01,229 --> 00:32:04,148 Captain Chaudhry uses his heading knob 520 00:32:04,148 --> 00:32:08,069 to turn the plane sharply left, away from the hills. 521 00:32:10,863 --> 00:32:14,075 But the plane, it keeps flying in the same direction. 522 00:32:14,200 --> 00:32:16,285 It's not turning. 523 00:32:26,754 --> 00:32:28,506 He's still in NAV. 524 00:32:29,298 --> 00:32:32,510 Investigators realize that the captain 525 00:32:32,635 --> 00:32:35,596 forgot his plane was in navigation mode 526 00:32:35,596 --> 00:32:37,348 and not heading mode, 527 00:32:37,348 --> 00:32:40,226 which is required to turn the aircraft. 528 00:32:40,351 --> 00:32:43,688 If the aircraft is flying in NAV mode, 529 00:32:43,813 --> 00:32:47,191 {\an8}it will keep on flying on its predetermined course, 530 00:32:47,316 --> 00:32:51,487 whether or not the crew change the heading select. 531 00:32:53,072 --> 00:32:55,825 Why aren't we turning left? 532 00:32:55,950 --> 00:32:57,201 Pull up. 533 00:32:57,201 --> 00:32:59,203 Captain Chaudhry doesn't realize 534 00:32:59,203 --> 00:33:01,914 that his inputs are futile. 535 00:33:02,040 --> 00:33:04,751 Pull up. Pull up. 536 00:33:04,876 --> 00:33:07,295 In order to get from NAV mode into heading mode, 537 00:33:07,420 --> 00:33:11,090 you pull the knob out and that engages heading mode. 538 00:33:11,090 --> 00:33:13,551 He forgot to pull it out. 539 00:33:14,719 --> 00:33:18,389 He realizes his error and pulls the knob here 540 00:33:18,389 --> 00:33:21,309 at 40 seconds before impact. 541 00:33:28,441 --> 00:33:29,817 Ah. 542 00:33:30,485 --> 00:33:32,236 When Captain Chaudhry 543 00:33:32,236 --> 00:33:33,946 tries to correct his error, 544 00:33:33,946 --> 00:33:36,741 he only makes a bad situation worse. 545 00:33:37,700 --> 00:33:40,078 Sir, turn left. 546 00:33:40,078 --> 00:33:42,413 Why isn't it turning left? 547 00:33:47,502 --> 00:33:49,754 Captain Chaudhry has dialed in 548 00:33:49,879 --> 00:33:51,839 so many left turns, 549 00:33:51,964 --> 00:33:55,426 that his last input is now to the plane's right. 550 00:33:55,426 --> 00:34:00,056 The Airbus takes the shortest route to get to that heading, 551 00:34:00,181 --> 00:34:03,851 directly towards the Margalla Hills. 552 00:34:06,562 --> 00:34:10,191 He's in heading mode for the rest of the flight. 553 00:34:14,904 --> 00:34:17,657 The investigation saw that the captain was so reliant 554 00:34:17,782 --> 00:34:20,576 on the automation that he was trying to turn the aircraft 555 00:34:20,701 --> 00:34:21,828 to the left, 556 00:34:21,828 --> 00:34:24,622 asking why the aircraft wasn't turning to the left, 557 00:34:24,622 --> 00:34:26,874 but he didn't even use his side stick 558 00:34:27,000 --> 00:34:29,919 and actually turn the aircraft to the left manually. 559 00:34:29,919 --> 00:34:32,046 Why aren't we turning left? 560 00:34:32,171 --> 00:34:33,589 Terrain Ahead. 561 00:34:33,715 --> 00:34:36,342 Investigators now know why Captain Chaudry 562 00:34:36,467 --> 00:34:39,429 was unable to turn left and avoid the mountains. 563 00:34:39,429 --> 00:34:41,597 But one question remains: 564 00:34:41,597 --> 00:34:44,684 Why didn't the first officer recognize the mistakes 565 00:34:44,684 --> 00:34:47,645 and do something to correct them? 566 00:34:47,770 --> 00:34:49,689 Sir, we're going down! 567 00:34:49,689 --> 00:34:51,607 Pull up. 568 00:34:53,985 --> 00:34:55,987 100 knots. 569 00:34:55,987 --> 00:34:57,488 Check. 570 00:34:57,488 --> 00:35:00,283 Investigators find a possible explanation 571 00:35:00,408 --> 00:35:02,618 for the first officer's puzzling behaviour... 572 00:35:02,618 --> 00:35:04,120 V1... 573 00:35:04,245 --> 00:35:07,457 ...at the very start of Flight 202. 574 00:35:07,457 --> 00:35:08,833 Rotate. 575 00:35:08,958 --> 00:35:12,295 ... as it took off for Islamabad. 576 00:35:13,379 --> 00:35:15,506 The flight starts with the pilots 577 00:35:15,631 --> 00:35:17,675 working efficiently as a crew. 578 00:35:17,800 --> 00:35:19,510 Positive rate. 579 00:35:19,510 --> 00:35:22,263 Gear up. 580 00:35:25,016 --> 00:35:27,268 Gear up. 581 00:35:29,562 --> 00:35:32,774 The take-off from Karachi is textbook. 582 00:35:36,069 --> 00:35:39,447 From initial push back start up 583 00:35:39,572 --> 00:35:42,867 and all the way to take off everything seemed normal. 584 00:35:44,452 --> 00:35:47,747 We are clear to climb to flight level... 585 00:35:47,872 --> 00:35:49,540 Explain to me why that is blue 586 00:35:49,540 --> 00:35:52,585 but the other symbols are white. 587 00:35:53,294 --> 00:35:55,630 The pilots' cordial relationship 588 00:35:55,755 --> 00:35:57,298 soon changes. 589 00:35:58,007 --> 00:35:59,759 Sir? 590 00:35:59,884 --> 00:36:02,887 There, on your display. Why is that symbol blue 591 00:36:03,012 --> 00:36:05,056 but the others are white? 592 00:36:05,056 --> 00:36:07,225 You should know why that is. 593 00:36:07,809 --> 00:36:10,395 I believe it's because the flight plan differs 594 00:36:10,520 --> 00:36:12,063 from the current route. 595 00:36:12,063 --> 00:36:13,856 No, that's wrong. 596 00:36:13,856 --> 00:36:17,360 It's because it's the one being navigated towards. Basic. 597 00:36:17,485 --> 00:36:21,155 Do you know how to modify this point? 598 00:36:21,155 --> 00:36:23,324 From the main menu... 599 00:36:23,324 --> 00:36:25,910 Oh you don't need to return to the main menu. 600 00:36:25,910 --> 00:36:27,578 You can do it on the screen. 601 00:36:29,706 --> 00:36:32,500 What did they teach you in that so-called training of yours? 602 00:36:33,710 --> 00:36:36,379 Captain Chaudhry is heard quizzing 603 00:36:36,504 --> 00:36:38,798 and berating his First Officer. 604 00:36:38,923 --> 00:36:42,427 This wasn't normal behaviour. 605 00:36:42,427 --> 00:36:44,804 It seems it was only really for the purpose 606 00:36:44,804 --> 00:36:48,558 of putting his first officer in his place, 607 00:36:48,558 --> 00:36:51,352 making sure he knew who was in charge 608 00:36:51,352 --> 00:36:53,730 and to do as he was told. 609 00:36:55,273 --> 00:36:56,858 What's he doing? 610 00:36:56,983 --> 00:37:01,446 If you don't know how to use the Flight Management System... 611 00:37:01,571 --> 00:37:03,948 ... then what use are you in the cockpit? 612 00:37:03,948 --> 00:37:07,785 You might as well go back and help the girls serve tea. 613 00:37:10,038 --> 00:37:13,708 Yes. Sorry, sir. 614 00:37:20,673 --> 00:37:23,551 What about maximum thrust available for climb? 615 00:37:23,551 --> 00:37:25,928 Can you at least tell me what that is? 616 00:37:25,928 --> 00:37:29,974 This has been going on for nearly an hour now. Torture. 617 00:37:32,310 --> 00:37:35,313 Radio ahead to Islamabad for the weather. 618 00:37:36,272 --> 00:37:38,066 Do you know how to use the radio? 619 00:37:38,191 --> 00:37:39,567 Yes. 620 00:37:42,403 --> 00:37:45,406 Captain Chaudhry is a very experienced pilot. 621 00:37:45,406 --> 00:37:48,618 He should know that this is not how we behave 622 00:37:48,618 --> 00:37:51,412 on the flight deck of an airliner. 623 00:38:03,925 --> 00:38:07,804 Investigators wonder why Captain Chaudhry 624 00:38:07,804 --> 00:38:11,099 would act so aggressively towards his First Officer. 625 00:38:11,099 --> 00:38:14,894 He was recently treated for diabetes and hypertension 626 00:38:15,019 --> 00:38:17,980 but deemed fit to fly. 627 00:38:19,273 --> 00:38:20,817 Anything? 628 00:38:20,942 --> 00:38:23,861 Pilots who flew with him said he was demanding, 629 00:38:23,861 --> 00:38:25,905 sometimes difficult. 630 00:38:25,905 --> 00:38:28,699 But nothing at this level. 631 00:38:29,742 --> 00:38:32,495 Maybe it had more to do with him. 632 00:38:34,163 --> 00:38:36,541 Could the First Officer's background 633 00:38:36,541 --> 00:38:40,002 have affected his Captain's attitude towards him? 634 00:38:43,881 --> 00:38:46,676 In Pakistan there has been a hidden rivalry 635 00:38:46,676 --> 00:38:49,387 between air force pilots and the people 636 00:38:49,512 --> 00:38:51,889 who are in the commercial side already. 637 00:38:51,889 --> 00:38:55,309 They feel that ex-air force guys 638 00:38:55,309 --> 00:38:57,729 they are taking away their opportunities. 639 00:39:00,481 --> 00:39:01,899 Investigators believe 640 00:39:02,025 --> 00:39:04,152 that the Captain's abusive behaviour 641 00:39:04,277 --> 00:39:07,029 might explain one of the mysteries of this tragedy, 642 00:39:07,029 --> 00:39:11,909 why First Officer Ahmed never took control of the plane. 643 00:39:14,203 --> 00:39:16,289 All the first officer had to do 644 00:39:16,289 --> 00:39:18,374 was to take manual control of the aircraft 645 00:39:18,374 --> 00:39:20,585 and fly it away from the mountain. 646 00:39:22,086 --> 00:39:25,673 Investigators scrutinize First Officer Ahmed's 647 00:39:25,673 --> 00:39:29,093 actions leading up to the crash of Flight 202. 648 00:39:29,218 --> 00:39:32,263 His first officer tells the captain to pull up three times 649 00:39:32,388 --> 00:39:35,516 and to turn left twice. 650 00:39:35,516 --> 00:39:39,062 But he never says he's taking control. 651 00:39:43,524 --> 00:39:45,276 If I were the first officer, 652 00:39:45,276 --> 00:39:47,028 I would take over the control, 653 00:39:47,028 --> 00:39:48,821 pull back on the side stick 654 00:39:48,946 --> 00:39:51,199 to create the max performance maneuver, 655 00:39:51,324 --> 00:39:53,951 apply TOGA thrust and keep climbing 656 00:39:53,951 --> 00:39:56,120 till I'm clear of the hills. 657 00:39:57,038 --> 00:39:59,749 The team believes the Captain's behaviour 658 00:39:59,749 --> 00:40:03,336 earlier in the flight explains why the First Officer 659 00:40:03,336 --> 00:40:05,922 allowed him to mishandle the approach. 660 00:40:06,047 --> 00:40:09,467 If you don't know how to use the Flight Management System 661 00:40:09,592 --> 00:40:12,637 then what use are you in the cockpit? 662 00:40:15,306 --> 00:40:17,266 We have the captain's behaviour, 663 00:40:17,392 --> 00:40:20,186 which was so overbearing, so autocratic, 664 00:40:20,186 --> 00:40:22,605 so nasty 665 00:40:22,605 --> 00:40:25,650 that it served to completely shatter the self-confidence 666 00:40:25,775 --> 00:40:27,819 of the first officer. 667 00:40:28,319 --> 00:40:29,987 First Officer Ahmed 668 00:40:30,113 --> 00:40:32,824 allows procedures to be set aside... 669 00:40:32,949 --> 00:40:37,995 Switching to NAV Mode for managed approach to Runway 1-2. 670 00:40:38,121 --> 00:40:41,374 Okay... Sir. 671 00:40:42,125 --> 00:40:44,252 ...and then fails to take control 672 00:40:44,252 --> 00:40:48,631 when his captain flies the plane directly towards the mountains. 673 00:40:49,298 --> 00:40:52,468 He was so worn down by the Captain's harsh behaviour 674 00:40:52,593 --> 00:40:55,054 that he just couldn't stand up to him. 675 00:40:55,179 --> 00:40:58,266 He became a bystander. 676 00:41:02,061 --> 00:41:04,272 The first officer clearly knows 677 00:41:04,397 --> 00:41:05,773 that what they're doing is wrong. 678 00:41:05,773 --> 00:41:08,818 He knows that his captain is disoriented, 679 00:41:08,943 --> 00:41:11,529 that the aircraft is on a collision course 680 00:41:11,654 --> 00:41:14,657 with a mountain, and yet, somehow, 681 00:41:14,782 --> 00:41:17,702 he doesn't have it in him to intervene. 682 00:41:19,203 --> 00:41:21,998 Terrain ahead. Pull up. 683 00:41:22,123 --> 00:41:25,626 Sir, we are going down. Sir, we are going down! 684 00:41:25,626 --> 00:41:27,503 Three and a half minutes after the start 685 00:41:27,628 --> 00:41:29,172 of the approach... 686 00:41:29,172 --> 00:41:30,590 We are going down! 687 00:41:30,590 --> 00:41:33,676 ...the Airbus slams into the Hills... 688 00:41:35,386 --> 00:41:37,889 ...killing everyone on board. 689 00:41:43,895 --> 00:41:46,522 This is one of the most extraordinary 690 00:41:46,647 --> 00:41:48,983 accidents I've seen. 691 00:41:50,860 --> 00:41:55,656 There were no technical factors in this accident. 692 00:41:56,574 --> 00:41:59,077 There was nothing wrong with the aircraft, 693 00:41:59,202 --> 00:42:01,579 there was nothing wrong with the engines. 694 00:42:01,704 --> 00:42:05,249 It was all a matter of human misjudgment 695 00:42:05,375 --> 00:42:07,043 and human error. 696 00:42:13,174 --> 00:42:15,593 If he doesn't try the approach in NAV mode, 697 00:42:15,593 --> 00:42:17,929 there's no accident. 698 00:42:18,763 --> 00:42:21,140 All the warning signs were there, 699 00:42:21,140 --> 00:42:23,017 telling him what to do. 700 00:42:23,935 --> 00:42:27,021 It should have been easy to recover. 701 00:42:27,021 --> 00:42:28,564 Very. 702 00:42:29,315 --> 00:42:32,568 If he hadn't taken his First Officer out of the picture, 703 00:42:33,694 --> 00:42:35,613 a different outcome. 704 00:42:36,364 --> 00:42:38,699 Absolutely incredible. 705 00:42:44,205 --> 00:42:48,126 It's hard to believe that somebody of his experience 706 00:42:48,126 --> 00:42:54,507 would make so many errors and mishandling of the aircraft. 707 00:42:54,507 --> 00:42:57,969 Uh, it... I just... it just defies logic. 708 00:43:01,389 --> 00:43:02,890 The final report 709 00:43:02,890 --> 00:43:05,268 into the crash of Airblue Flight 202 710 00:43:05,393 --> 00:43:08,813 makes several recommendations to Pakistani airlines 711 00:43:08,813 --> 00:43:12,942 including better briefings on the circling approach procedures 712 00:43:13,067 --> 00:43:16,279 and better crew management training. 713 00:43:18,239 --> 00:43:20,908 This accident shows that cockpit management 714 00:43:20,908 --> 00:43:23,244 and the atmosphere in the cockpit 715 00:43:23,244 --> 00:43:24,579 that's set by the captain 716 00:43:24,704 --> 00:43:27,206 is just as important as an operating aircraft 717 00:43:27,331 --> 00:43:28,666 and operating engines. 718 00:43:28,791 --> 00:43:32,128 And in 2018 the airport in Islamabad 719 00:43:32,128 --> 00:43:36,340 is replaced with a more modern airport with two runways 720 00:43:36,340 --> 00:43:38,593 that are well away from the hills 721 00:43:38,593 --> 00:43:41,637 that claimed the lives of the 152 people 722 00:43:41,763 --> 00:43:43,806 on board Flight 202. 723 00:43:46,392 --> 00:43:52,190 As I learned more, I really felt extremely bad. 724 00:43:53,775 --> 00:43:57,820 I felt very sad about that loss. 725 00:44:01,949 --> 00:44:04,160 It was a preventable accident. 726 00:44:12,418 --> 00:44:14,796 Subtitling: difuze